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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks are composed of sensor nodes which are small, 
battery-powered devices having limited resources. Sensor nodes collect data from 
environment, and transmit them via their radio communication medium towards a base 
station. Although majority of wireless sensor applications use static sensor nodes, 
sensor node can be mobile either by itself, or due to environmental factors such as wind, 
water, or deployment of sensor nodes on moving objects. 
It is not easy to control sensor nodes once they are deployed in a hostile 
environment. Due to mostly being unattended, sensor nodes become open to physical 
attacks such as wormhole attack, which is our focus in this thesis. In wormhole attack, 
an attacker tunnels messages received in one part of the network over a low-latency 
wormhole link and replays them in a different part of the network. By doing so, the 
attacker makes two distant nodes believe that they are in the communication range of 
each other. The low-latency tunnel attracts network traffic on the wormhole link which 
can empower the attacker to perform traffic analysis, denial of service attacks; collect 
data to compromise cryptographic material; or just selectively drop data packets through 
controlling these routes using the wormhole link.  
In this thesis, we propose a distributed wormhole detection scheme for mobile 
wireless sensor networks in which mobility of sensor nodes is utilized to estimate two 
network features (i.e. network node density, standard deviation in network node 
density) through using neighboring information in a local manner. Wormhole attack is 
detected via observing anomalies in the neighbor nodes’ behaviors based on the 
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estimated network features and the neighboring information. We analyze the 
performance of proposed scheme via simulations using different system parameters. 
The results show that our scheme achieves a detection rate up to 100% with very small 
false positive rate (at most 1.5%) if the system parameters are chosen accordingly. 
Moreover, our solution requires neither additional hardware nor tight clock 
synchronization which are both costly for sensor networks. 
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MOBĠL KABLOSUZ DUYARGA AĞLARINDA SOLUCAN DELĠĞĠ 
SALDIRILARINI TESPĠT ETMEK ĠÇĠN DAĞITIK BĠR ġEMA 
Oya ġimĢek  
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2011 
Tez DanıĢmanı: Doç. Dr. Albert Levi 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Solucan Deliği Saldırısı, Güvenlik, Mobil Kablosuz Duyarga Ağları 
Özet 
Kablosuz duyarga ağları küçük, pille çalıĢan, sınırlı kaynaklara sahip aygıtlardan 
oluĢur. Duyarga düğümleri çevreden veri toplar ve bu verileri radyo iletiĢim ortamı 
üzerinden baz istasyonuna iletirler. Kablosuz duyarga ağı uygulamalarının çoğunluğu 
statik duyarga düğümlerini kullansa da duyarga düğümleri kendiliğinden, ya da rüzgar, 
hava gibi çevresel etkenlerden, ya da duyarga düğümlerinin hareketli nesneler üzerine 
konuĢlandırılmasından dolayı mobil olabilir. 
Duyarga düğümleri saldırılara açık bir ortamda konuĢlandırıldıklarında 
güvenliklerini sağlamak kolay değildir. Genelde gözetimsiz olduğundan dolayı, duyarga 
düğümleri bu tezin odağını oluĢturan solucan deliği saldırısı gibi fiziksel saldırılara açık 
hale gelirler. Solucan deliği saldırısında, saldırgan ağın bir bölgesinde alınan mesajları 
düĢük gecikmeli solucan deliği bağlantısı üzerinden gönderir ve bu mesajları ağın baĢka 
bir bölgesinden tekrar yayınlar. Böyle yaparak, saldırgan birbirine uzak iki düğümü 
birbirlerinin iletiĢim alanında olduklarına inandırır. DüĢük gecikmeli tünel, ağ trafiğini 
solucan deliği bağlantısı üzerine çeker. Saldırgan, solucan deliği bağlantısını kullanan 
bu rotaları kontrol ederek trafik analizi ve servis reddi saldırılarını gerçekleĢtirebilir; 
Ģifrelemeyle ilgili bilgileri çıkarmak için veri toplayabilir; ya da veri paketlerini seçerek 
düĢürebilir. 
Bu tezde, mobil duyarga ağlarında solucan deliği saldırısını tespit etmek için 
dağıtık bir Ģema önerdik. Bu Ģemada lokal komĢuluk bilgilerinini kullanarak iki farklı 
ağ özelliğinin (ağ düğüm yoğunluğu, ağ düğüm yoğunluğunun standart sapması) 
hesaplanmasında duyarga düğümlerinin mobilitesinden yararlanıldı. Solucan deliği 
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saldırısı, hesaplanan ağ özellikleri ve komĢuluk bilgileri baz alınarak, komĢu 
düğümlerin davranıĢlarındaki anormalliklerin gözlemlenmesi yoluyla tespit edilir. 
Önerilen Ģemanın performansını simülasyonlarla analiz ettik. Sonuçlar, sistem 
parametreleri uygun bir Ģekilde seçildiğinde Ģemamızın %100’e varan bir doğru tespit 
oranına eriĢtiğini gösterdi. Bununla birlikte, hatalı tespit oranı %1.5 gibi çok düĢük bir 
düzeyde kaldı. Üstelik, çözümümüz duyarga düğümleri için pahalı sayılabilecek bir ek 
donanıma ya da katı bir zaman senkronizasyonuna ihtiyaç duymaz. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family 
ix 
 
Acknowledgements 
First of all, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Albert Levi, for all his support 
throughout my university experience including guiding and motivating me in all of my 
works.  
I also thank Hüsnü Yenigün, Erkay SavaĢ, Yücel Saygın, and Özgür Erçetin for 
devoting their time amongst their high volume schedule and joining my jury. 
I thank all classmates at FENS 2001 Lab. 
I thank my dearest Ahmet Hakan Göral for his mental support during my thesis. 
I thank my family for supporting me in every aspects of my life and growing me up to 
this day. 
I specially thank to my sister Emel ġimĢek for being there when I need her to be and 
supporting me no matter what happens. 
I also thank Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBĠTAK) for 
funding me by BĠDEB scholarship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Contribution of the Thesis ....................................................................... 3 
1.2. Organization of the Thesis ...................................................................... 3 
2. BACKGROUND ON WORMHOLE DETECTION IN WIRELESS 
SENSOR NETWORKS .................................................................................................... 4 
2.1. Wormhole Attacks .................................................................................. 4 
2.2. Literature on Wormhole Detection ......................................................... 5 
3. THE PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED SCHEME FOR WORMHOLE 
ATTACK DETECTION IN MOBILE WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS ............... 10 
3.1. Network Assumptions and Threat Model ............................................. 12 
3.2. The Proposed Approach ........................................................................ 13 
3.2.1. Motivation ......................................................................................... 13 
3.2.2. Overview of the Protocol .................................................................. 14 
3.2.3. STABILIZATION PHASE .............................................................. 15 
3.2.3.1. Discover Neighbors ....................................................................... 16 
3.2.3.2. Share Neighboring Information ..................................................... 16 
3.2.3.3. Calculate & Update Statistical Metrics.......................................... 16 
3.2.4. DETECTION PHASE ...................................................................... 18 
3.2.4.1. Discover Neighbors ....................................................................... 18 
3.2.4.2. Share Neighboring Information ..................................................... 18 
xi 
 
3.2.4.3. Check for Suspicious Nodes based on Statistical Metrics ............. 19 
3.2.4.4. Revoke Detected Node .................................................................. 21 
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS ........................................................... 22 
4.1. System Parameters & Performance Metrics ......................................... 22 
4.2. Simulation Setup ................................................................................... 23 
4.3. Simulation Results ................................................................................ 24 
4.3.1. Detection Rates ................................................................................. 25 
4.3.2. False Positive Rates .......................................................................... 30 
4.3.3. Detection Round ............................................................................... 35 
4.3.4. Memory Requirements ..................................................................... 39 
4.3.5. Sensitivity against Node Density and Size of Deployment Area ..... 48 
5. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 58 
6. REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 59 
xii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: Wormhole attack scenario .................................................................... 5 
Figure  3.1: Workflow of the proposed scheme .................................................... 15 
Figure  3.2: Pseudo-code of local detection .......................................................... 20 
Figure  3.3: Pseudo-code of global detection ........................................................ 21 
Figure  4.1: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , 
and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. ............................... 26 
Figure  4.2: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , 
and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. .............................. 27 
Figure  4.3: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , 
and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . ..................... 28 
Figure  4.4: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , 
and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . .................... 29 
Figure  4.5: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. ........... 31 
Figure  4.6: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. ........... 32 
Figure  4.7: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 33 
Figure  4.8: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 34 
xiii 
 
Figure  4.9: Detection round vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. ........... 36 
Figure  4.10: Detection round vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. ........... 37 
Figure  4.11: Detection round vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 38 
Figure  4.12: Detection round vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 39 
Figure  4.13: Average LocalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 
10revocT , 20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen 
randomly. ........................................................................................................................ 41 
Figure  4.14: Average LocalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 
10revocT , 20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen 
randomly. ........................................................................................................................ 42 
Figure  4.15: Average LocalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 
10revocT , 20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  
)75,75( . ........................................................................................................................... 43 
Figure  4.16: Average LocalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 
10revocT , 20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  
)75,75( . ........................................................................................................................... 44 
Figure  4.17: Average GlobalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 
10revocT , 20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen 
randomly. ........................................................................................................................ 45 
xiv 
 
Figure  4.18: Average GlobalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 
10revocT , 20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen 
randomly. ........................................................................................................................ 46 
Figure  4.19: Average GlobalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 
10revocT , 20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  
)75,75( . ........................................................................................................................... 47 
Figure  4.20: Average GlobalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 
10revocT , 20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  
)75,75( . ........................................................................................................................... 48 
Figure  4.21: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 40revocT , 
80revocT , and 120revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . 50 
Figure  4.22: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 40revocT , 
80revocT , and 120revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . 51 
Figure  4.23: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 40revocT , 
80revocT , and 120revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 52 
Figure  4.24: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 40revocT , 
80revocT , and 120revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( .
 ........................................................................................................................................ 53 
Figure  4.25: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 20revocT , 
40revocT , and 60revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . . 54 
Figure  4.26: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 20revocT , 
40revocT , and 60revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . . 55 
xv 
 
Figure  4.27: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 20revocT , 
40revocT , and 60revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 56 
Figure  4.28: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 20revocT , 
40revocT , and 60revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 57 
 
 
 
 
xvi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1: List of notations used in Section 3 ....................................................... 11 
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As a result of significant advances in hardware manufacturing and wireless 
communication technology along with efficient software algorithms, wireless sensor 
networks [1] emerged as a promising network infrastructure for various applications such 
as environmental monitoring, medical care, industry and agriculture, military surveillance, 
target detection and tracking. Wireless sensor networks composed of many battery-
powered, small, and resource constraint devices called sensor nodes. Sensor nodes are 
capable of sensing environment, processing data, and communicating with other sensor 
nodes in the network using short-range radio. Wireless sensor networks can be deployed 
randomly which can be viewed as advantage if we consider the deployment in inaccessible 
terrains or disaster relief operations. However, in such random deployments, sensor 
network protocols and algorithms need to be self-organized. Although majority of wireless 
sensor applications use static sensor nodes, sensor nodes can be mobile either due to 
improvements in technology, or environmental causes such as wind, water, or deployment 
of sensor nodes on moving objects. ZebraNet [21] is an example of mobile wireless sensor 
network application which is a habitat monitoring system. In ZebraNet, sensors are 
attached to zebras and collect information about their migration and behavior pattern. 
Some other applications are detailed in [22]. 
Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to various malicious attacks. Due to the 
open nature of wireless communication channels, an attacker can easily eavesdrop the 
communication between sensor nodes which can lead to message tampering, or identity 
spoofing. In order to prevent such attacks, strong security algorithms should be 
implemented. These strong security algorithms require more resources such as 
computational power, or tamper-proof hardware. However, sensor nodes have limited 
resources for the sake of being low-cost devices, and a wireless network is composed of 
hundreds maybe thousands of sensor nodes. Hence, implementing such strong security 
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algorithms seems infeasible without increasing the cost of sensor nodes, or without making 
a trade-off between security and performance. Another problem is that it is not easy to 
control sensor nodes once they are deployed in hostile environments such as military 
fields. Due to being mostly unattended, sensor nodes become open to physical attacks such 
as identity spoofing, node capture and compromise which may lead to various attacks 
including wormhole attack, Sybil attack, denial of service attacks. These malicious attacks, 
which are generally categorized as mote class / laptop class attacks, insider / outsider 
attacks, passive / active attacks, are well described in the literature [4].  
Wormhole attack is an example of passive, outsider, laptop class attacks, where 
there are two or more malicious colluding nodes. An attacker tunnels messages received in 
one part of the network over a wormhole link and replays them in a different part of the 
network. Due to the low-latency tunneling over wormhole link, the attacker makes two 
distant nodes believe they are in the communication range of each other, and the network 
topology can be distorted as a result of these fake neighboring connections. Also, sensor 
nodes which are close to transceivers of the wormhole deplete their battery earlier as a 
result of heavy packet forwarding. Such an attack is a serious threat especially on routing 
protocols. The low-latency tunnel attracts network traffic on the wormhole link which can 
empower the attacker to perform traffic analysis, denial of service attacks; collect data to 
compromise cryptographic material; or just selectively drop data packets through 
controlling these routes using the wormhole link.  
Several techniques have been proposed to detect wormhole attacks in wireless 
sensor networks which mostly focus on static networks. These solutions, some of which 
will be detailed later, are mainly based on detecting the maximum distance any message 
can travel, or the maximum time of travel of any message, discovering one-hop neighbors 
in a secure way, or monitoring the data traffic of neighbor nodes. Most of the proposed 
techniques require specialized hardware such as a GPS receiver or antennas, highly 
accurate time or location measurements, tight clock synchronization, or specialized trusted 
nodes, which seems infeasible for large scale wireless sensor networks because of its 
resource limitations and economic costs. Moreover, mobility of sensor nodes is not 
considered in these solutions. 
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1.1. Contribution of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we propose a distributed wormhole detection scheme for mobile 
wireless sensor networks which is composed of two phases: (i) stabilization phase, and (ii) 
detection phase. In stabilization phase, two network features (i.e. network node density, 
standard deviation in network node density) are estimated via using local neighbor 
information along with preset parameters which are detailed in Section 3. Detection phase 
starts once stabilization phase ends. In this phase, the wormhole attack is detected via 
observing anomalies based on the estimated network features along with the neighboring 
information. Our scheme utilizes the mobility of the sensor nodes to estimate two above-
mentioned network features in a local manner. Without a wormhole attack being 
performed, the difference between the number of neighbors of a node and its estimated 
network density does not exceed the standard deviation of its network density. However, 
under wormhole attack, this difference can be higher due to fake neighboring connections, 
especially when a node is close to the wormhole ends. 
Our scheme achieves a detection rate up to 100% and very small false positive rate 
(at most 1.5%) when the parameters are chosen accordingly. Moreover, our solution 
requires neither additional hardware nor tight clock synchronization both of which are 
costly for sensor networks in terms of power consumption and economic costs. 
1.2. Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is as follows. Section 2 gives general background information 
on wormhole attacks in wireless sensor networks and presents previous solutions in the 
literature. In Section 3, details of the proposed scheme are explained. Section 4 presents 
performance details including system assumptions and threat model, performance metrics, 
and simulation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the thesis. 
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2. BACKGROUND ON WORMHOLE DETECTION IN WIRELESS SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
In this section, background information about wormhole attacks and proposed 
solutions are presented. Section 2.1 explains the wormhole attacks as well as their effects 
on the network while Section 2.2 details the proposed solutions for wormhole attack 
detection. 
2.1. Wormhole Attacks 
Wormhole attack is an example of passive, outsider, laptop class attacks, where 
there are two or more malicious colluding nodes. An attacker tunnels messages received in 
one part of the network over a wormhole link (i.e. out-of band hidden channels such as a 
wired link, high power transmissions, packet encapsulation.) and replays them in a 
different part of the network. Figure 2.1 shows a typical wormhole attack scenario where 
node X and node Y are captured by an attacker and a wormhole is created via wired link. 
Each packet received at node X is sent to node Y over the wired link, and replayed in that 
part of the network. Due to the low-latency tunneling over wormhole link, nodes a, b, and 
c which are in the communication range of X believe that node e and d are their neighbors 
which is not the real case. Similarly, each packet received at node Y is sent to X over the 
wormhole link and replayed at that part of the network. By doing so, node d and e believe 
that they are neighbors with node a, b, and c which is not the real case. Network topology 
can be distorted as a result of fake neighboring connections introduced by the wormhole 
link. 
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Figure 2.1: Wormhole attack scenario 
Such an attack is a serious threat especially on routing protocols. The low-latency 
tunnel attracts network traffic on the wormhole link which can empower the attacker to 
perform traffic analysis, denial of service attacks; collect data to compromise 
cryptographic material; or just selectively drop data packets through controlling these 
routes using the wormhole link. In [3], simulations show that more than 50% of the data 
packets are attracted to fake neighboring connections and get discarded when there are 
more than two wormholes in the network. Moreover, an attacker can perform this attack 
without compromising any legitimate nodes, or knowing any cryptographic materials since 
the attacker neither creates new packets nor alters existing packets. Hence, wormhole 
attack cannot be prevented using only cryptographic measures. 
2.2. Literature on Wormhole Detection 
In [2], the concept of packet leashes are proposed to defend against wormhole 
attacks. The idea is to restrict the maximum transmission distance that a packet can travel 
through using either location information or tight time synchronization. Temporal leash 
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guarantees that each packet has an upper bound on its life time. Hence, maximum 
travelling distance of the packet is also restricted. Each node appends a timestamp to each 
sent packet, and the network is assumed to be tightly synchronized. Geographical leash 
guarantees that the recipient of each packet is within a certain distance from the sender. 
Each node is assumed to know its exact location, and it appends this information along 
with sending time to each sent packet. The recipient nodes use both location and time 
information to verify whether a packet is sent over a wormhole link. Geographical leash 
requires loosely synchronized clocks. Both approaches need either location information 
and loosely synchronized clocks, or only tightly synchronized clocks. However, neither 
sensor node localization, nor network synchronization is not easy to achieve in wireless 
sensor networks. 
In [3], a cooperative scheme is proposed to prevent wormhole attacks in wireless ad 
hoc networks where each node in the network is assumed to be equipped with directional 
antennas [12], [13]. A directional antenna can transmit/receive signals most effectively in a 
particular direction (or more directions as in Omnidirectional antennas). Therefore, each 
node can obtain the direction of incoming packets though using specific sectors of its 
directional antenna. Since a node knows from which direction it gets a packet, it can derive 
the relative orientation of the sender node with respect to its own location. In the scenario 
where there is no wormhole, when a node sends a packet in a given direction, its neighbors 
should get that packet from the opposite direction. If there is a wormhole in the network, 
the above rule may be broken by fake neighbors due to the location of the wormhole. 
Hence, the wormhole can be detected. However, wormhole may be located such that it 
does not break the above mentioned rule. To overcome this problem, two algorithms are 
presented [3] in which a node cooperates with its neighbors during detection period. 
Although the proposed approach is efficient in terms of energy consumption, the 
requirement of directional antennas is not practical in large scale wireless sensor networks.  
SECTOR [5] is another proposed scheme for detection of wormhole attacks in 
wireless networks via enabling each node to securely discover its one-hop neighbors. To 
do so, the real physical distance between two nodes is calculated using an authenticated 
distance bounding protocol. Each node first sends a one-bit challenge request to the other 
node which will respond with a one-bit response instantly. After receiving the one-bit 
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response, each node locally calculates the difference between sending the challenge and 
receiving the response, and estimates the distance to the other node. Hence, each node can 
determine whether the calculated distance is within the maximum possible communication 
range. Accurate measurement of local timing is an essential part of this method which is 
possible with current technology. However, special medium access control protocols are 
required as well as a specialized hardware for an instant challenge request-response 
mechanism. 
In [6], two mechanisms are proposed to detect wormholes in wireless sensor 
networks. Neighbor number test (NNT) and all distances test (ADT) are both based on 
hypothesis testing and the results are probabilistic. NNT which is based on the distribution 
of neighboring-node-number detects the increase in the number of neighbors of the sensor 
nodes in order to detect bogus neighbors introduced by the wormhole. ADT detects the 
decrease of the lengths of the shortest paths between all pair of sensor nodes in order to 
detect shortcut links introduced by the wormhole. In both approaches, the sensor nodes 
send their neighbor lists to the base station and the base station runs the algorithm on the 
network graph which is reconstructed from the received neighborhood information. In 
other words, this is a centralized solution where the base station is assumed to have no 
resource limitations such as memory or computational power. However, this is not 
applicable in some wireless sensor network applications where the base station has limited 
resources. 
In [7], a centralized solution, Multi Dimensional Scaling – Visualization of 
Wormhole (MDS-VOW), is presented in which wormhole is detected via visualizing the 
distortions due to the existence of wormhole link using computed maps. In this approach, 
each sensor node estimates the distance to its neighbors and sends this information to a 
central controller which reconstructs the layout of the sensors using a multi-dimensional 
scaling algorithm. When there is a wormhole in the network, it creates distortions in the 
layout which leads the way to detecting and locating the wormhole. However, a central 
controller without computation and memory limitations is required in this technique. Also, 
each sensor node needs to estimate the distance to its neighbors which implies the 
requirement for either a localization algorithm or a GPS receiver to get location estimate. 
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In [8] and [9], a wormhole detection mechanism is proposed for wireless sensor 
networks performing under multi-path routing which is based on statistical analysis of 
multi-path (SAM). In most of the multi-path routing protocols, the wormhole link attracts 
the network traffic due to its low latency transmission, and thus, certain routes are chosen 
more frequently than others. Therefore, it is possible to detect wormhole attack and 
identify the malicious nodes via analyzing the difference between two of most frequently 
used links among all obtained routes. However, the success of the method depends on the 
availability of enough routing information. Neither specialized hardware nor any changes 
to existing systems is required in this solution. Despite the fact that this is an efficient and 
accurate solution under multi-path routing protocols, it cannot perform well under uni-path 
routing protocols. 
SeRLoc [10] is proposed as a localization scheme which is robust under wormhole 
attack via using location information. However, unlike the geographical leash approach 
[2], this approach requires only a small number of the nodes to be equipped with GPS 
receivers which are called guards. The guards broadcast their locations in their first-hop 
neighbors in an authentic way as well as protected against replay. Guards are also assumed 
to have larger radio range than other nodes ( R ), and they are placed R2  far from each 
other. Therefore, each node can hear from only one guard, the distance to that guard cannot 
exceed R , and a node cannot receive same message twice from the same guard. 
Otherwise, it is probable that a wormhole attack is being performed in the network. 
LiteWorp [11] is proposed to detect wormhole attacks in static networks. Each node 
is required to know its one-hop and two-hop neighbors once the network is deployed. 
Some of the nodes are chosen as guards which monitor neighboring nodes’ data 
transmission. This approach does not require any additional hardware, and efficient in 
static wireless networks. However, it cannot perform well in mobile wireless sensor 
networks with this setup. In [14], MobiWorp is introduced for wormhole detection in 
mobile ad hoc networks. The basics of this protocol are similar to LiteWorp [11] with 
addition of a central certification authority (CA) for global tracking of node positions via 
verifying the truth of any location. In other words, MobiWorp enables nodes to securely 
discover their one-hop and two-hop neighbors. However, all nodes are assumed to be 
aware of their current and destination locations, and thus, either GPS or location discovery 
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algorithms based on beacon nodes [15], [16], [17], [18] are required. Moreover, the 
network is assumed to be loosely synchronized, and the CA is not limited in terms of 
memory and computational power.  
Most of these proposed solutions focus on static networks, and thus, mobility is not 
considered. Also, they either require additional hardware (e.g. directional antennas in [3], 
GPS in [2], [7], and [14], a specialized hardware for one-bit challenge request-response [5] 
protocol), or a central controller [6], and [7] which is assumed to have unlimited resources, 
or special nodes such as guards in [10], or tight network synchronization [3] which is hard 
to achieve in sensor networks due to resource limitations. We propose a distributed 
solution without requiring additional hardware or tight time synchronization or an 
unlimited central controller, or special nodes. Our solution is simply based on statistical 
metrics explaining network which are estimated via utilizing mobility of the sensor nodes. 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
3. THE PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED SCHEME FOR WORMHOLE ATTACK 
DETECTION IN MOBILE WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
In this section, we propose a distributed wormhole detection protocol for mobile 
wireless sensor networks which detects anomaly in the network via taking the advantage of 
mobility based on the neighboring information. Our scheme uses the statistical metrics 
which are calculated locally using the neighboring information. Depending on the choice 
or system parameters, our scheme achieves a detection rate up to 100% and a very small 
false positive rate (at most 1.5%). 
The rest of this section is as follows. The network assumptions and threat model is 
explained in Section 3.1. Our detection scheme is detailed in Section 3.2.  
The notations which are used in this section are specified in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: List of notations used in Section 3 
A  Size of the network area ( 2m ) 
N  Number of nodes in the network 
R  Communication range ( m ) 
min  Minimum speed allowed ( sm / ) 
max  Maximum speed allowed ( sm / ) 
i  Identity of a node 
r
id  Local network density of node i  at round r  
r
i  Standard deviation  in 
r
id of node i  at round r  
i  The number of neighbors of node i  
iN  Set of neighbors of node i  
roundT  Round threshold 
alarmT  Alarm threshold 
revocT  The minimum number of nodes required to revoke a node 
  Weight for previous values of rid and 
r
i  
)1(   Weight for new values of rid and 
r
i  
S  Number of rounds in stabilization phase 
LocalSuspectsListi 
The list of locally suspected nodes that node i  witnessed but 
has not broadcasted to the network as globally suspected yet. 
GlobalSuspectsListi 
The list of globally suspected nodes that node i  has which is 
more or less same for all nodes. 
 
12 
 
3.1. Network Assumptions and Threat Model 
The network is assumed to be composed of mobile nodes which moves based on 
random way point model. In this mobility model, each node chooses a random destination 
and moves towards it with a speed uniformly distributed in [ min , max ]. Each node stops 
for a preset duration when it reaches the destination. Moreover, the network is 
homogeneous which implies that all sensor nodes in the network have same 
communication range as well as the same physical properties. The sensor nodes are 
deployed randomly using uniform distribution in the sensing area. None of the nodes know 
their location information, or have GPS. The deployment area is much larger than the 
communication range of the nodes. More importantly, a node can obtain the neighbor 
count information of its neighbors as well as its own neighboring information via a secure 
neighbor discovery protocol in terms of cryptographic measures such as authenticity, 
integrity, and confidentiality. Secure neighbor discovery is out of the scope of the thesis. 
There are proposed solutions for neighbor discovery, [23], [24], [25], [26], addressing node 
mobility as well as energy efficiency in the literature. We assume that appropriate 
cryptographic algorithms and key infrastructures considering resource limitations in sensor 
network are used. Necessary link level security requirements (i.e. confidentiality, 
authentication, and integrity) are assumed to be fulfilled by the lower layers. Hence, the 
attacker cannot alter existing data packets and messages or fabricate new ones. 
Due to its nature and being an outsider attack, a wormhole attack can be performed 
without compromising cryptographic materials such as encryption key. It is sufficient for 
an attacker to capture two legitimate nodes and create a low-latency tunnel between them. 
In our proposal, we assume that the wormhole link is bidirectional. In other word, both 
ends of wormhole link overhear the packets; tunnel these packets to other node via this 
low-latency tunnel so that the receiving node can replay these packets at that end of the 
wormhole. The attacker may drop the packets selectively in a random way. However, by 
doing so, the wormhole link becomes less attractive and this is not a desired situation for 
the attacker. Thus, we assume that the attacker does not drop any packets. 
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3.2. The Proposed Approach 
In this section, the details of the proposed scheme are explained along with the 
motivation behind the approach. Section 3.2.1 gives the motivation behind this approach. 
The general overview of the proposed scheme is explained in Section 3.2.2. In Section 
3.2.3 the steps and details of the stabilization phase are explained. Finally, in Section 3.2.4, 
detection phase is detailed. 
3.2.1. Motivation 
There are several approaches for wormhole detection in wireless sensor networks 
some of which are detailed in Section 2. However, majority of these proposals focus on 
static networks, and thus, mobility is not considered. Also, most of these approaches 
require additional hardware (e.g. directional antennas in [3], GPS in [2], [7], and [14], a 
specialized hardware for one-bit challenge request-response [5] protocol), or a central 
controller [6], and [7] which is unlimited in resources, or special nodes such as guards in 
[10], or tight network synchronization [3]. Moreover, the limitations of sensor nodes and 
base stations are not considered in all solutions. Our aim in this study is to develop a 
distributed wormhole detection protocol for mobile sensor networks without requiring any 
additional hardware via utilizing mobility of the sensor nodes in the network.  
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3.2.2. Overview of the Protocol 
We propose a distributed wormhole detection scheme based on the statistical 
information derived from neighboring information. Our scheme aims to utilize the mobility 
feature of the sensor nodes to examine the environment and network properties, and derive 
new features which help understanding the network better. It includes two main phases: (i) 
stabilization, and (ii) detection phases.  
Stabilization phase is for sensor nodes to collect information from the network 
using neighboring information to estimate the node density of the network locally, rid  for 
node i  at 
thr  round, and to compute the standard deviation of the change in the estimated 
node density, ri . This phase runs once right after the uniform random deployment of the 
sensor nodes. We assume that there is no wormhole attack being performed during the 
stabilization phase. 
In detection phase, based on the pre-computed statistical values, the detection 
mechanism is activated to check for anomalies in the network, and detected nodes are 
revoked from the network. 
Workflow of these phases is shown in Figure 3.2.2.1. 
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Figure  3.1: Workflow of the proposed scheme 
3.2.3. STABILIZATION PHASE 
Stabilization phase starts right after the uniform random deployment of N  sensor 
nodes, and runs S rounds. In a round, each node discovers their neighbors securely, 
broadcasts its neighbor count, and locally computes statistical features of the network (i.e. 
r
id  and 
r
i ) after receiving all neighbor counts of its neighbors. 
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3.2.3.1. Discover Neighbors 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, neighbor discovery is not in the scope of the thesis. 
We assume that a secure neighbor discovery algorithm is used. There are proposed 
solutions, [23], [24], [25], [26], to discover one-hop neighbors in a secure way considering 
mobility of the nodes besides energy efficiency.  
3.2.3.2. Share Neighboring Information 
When a node learns its neighbors, it broadcasts an information packet including its 
own identity, i , and the number of its neighbors, i . This information is critical in the 
estimation of the network features ( rid  and 
r
i ). 
3.2.3.3. Calculate & Update Statistical Metrics 
After all nodes share the number of their neighbors, each node i  has the following 
information: its own neighbors, iN , the number of its own neighbor number, i , and 
neighbor count information of its neighbors, ij Nj . Then, node i  computes the 
network density, rid , and standard deviation in
r
id , 
r
i , in a local way using equations: 
00 id           (1) 
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We use exponential averaging, which we are inspired by its usage in TCP round 
trip time estimation, to give more importance to the latest data retrieved from neighbors 
without losing the previous calculated values.   and )1(   are the weights which are 
used to estimate standard deviation and local network density of a node. As shown in Eq.1 
and Eq.3, initial values for both node density and standard deviation are set to 0. At each 
round, each node estimates a candidate density value which is calculated by averaging the 
neighbor counts received from neighbors along with its own neighbor count. After that, the 
node updates its density via using the exponential average of the previous value and the 
new estimated value. The procedure is same for the calculation of standard deviation in the 
node density. The only difference here is that it uses basic standard deviation calculation 
via utilizing the neighbor count information received from neighbors. 
In the stabilization phase, apart from neighbor discovery messages, the only 
message overhead in the network is caused due to sharing neighboring information 
explained in Section 3.2.3.2. 
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3.2.4. DETECTION PHASE 
In detection phase, pre-computed network features (i.e. rid  and 
r
i ) along with 
round threshold, roundT , alarm threshold, alarmT , and the number of nodes to revoke a node, 
revocT , are used to detect the anomaly created by the wormhole link. Detection phase runs 
as long as the lifetime of the sensor node. A round in detection phase is composed of 
neighbor discovery, sharing the number of neighbors, testing detection criteria along with 
broadcasting specific messages when necessary, and finally revocation of detected nodes. 
3.2.4.1. Discover Neighbors 
Discovering neighbors is challenging in mobile wireless sensor networks. There are 
proposed solutions in [23], [24], [25], and [26] some of which focus on energy-efficiency, 
or neighbor list management, or mobility. As mentioned in Section 3.1 while explaining 
our assumptions, we assume that nodes are capable of defining their neighbors. 
3.2.4.2. Share Neighboring Information 
Sharing the neighborhood information is a crucial part of detection phase. Each 
node requires its neighbors sending their neighbor counts to detect a suspicious behavior. 
Each node broadcasts its identity along with the number of its neighbors as explained 
above, in Section 3.2.3.2.  
19 
 
3.2.4.3. Check for Suspicious Nodes based on Statistical Metrics 
After obtaining the neighborhood information, each node i  has the network 
density, Sid , and standard deviation in 
S
id , 
S
i , and the neighboring information 
ij Nj .  Node i detects possible anomaly using the check in Figure 3.2 which is the 
pseudo-code for local detection. It first checks whether the number of its own neighbors 
exceeds its locally-estimated density more than its locally-estimated standard deviation. If 
the difference exceeds the locally-estimated standard deviation, i  accuses its neighbors 
and adds them in its list for tracking suspicious nodes. Otherwise, node i  checks its 
neighbors one by one with the same method to detect a suspicious behavior and updates its 
list accordingly. If the alarm counter for a locally suspected node j exceeds the alarm 
threshold, then node i broadcasts a message deeming j is a globally suspected node. If any 
node in the list of locally suspected nodes does not show an anomaly during the round 
threshold, then node i deletes that node from its list. 
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Figure  3.2: Pseudo-code of local detection 
When a node i  receives a Global Suspect Message saying node j  is a potential 
malicious node, it runs the following check in Figure 3.3 which is the pseudo-code for 
global detection. To revoke node j, the number of nodes deeming node j as suspected must 
exceed the revocation threshold which is basically a preset percentage of the total number 
of nodes. 
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Figure  3.3: Pseudo-code of global detection 
3.2.4.4. Revoke Detected Node 
A globally suspected node can be revoked from network through node self-
destruction mechanisms proposed in [27] and [28]. When a node i  receives a Revoke 
Message saying node j  is a malicious node, it sends a message to the base station for 
revocation of j and updates its RevokedList accordingly.  
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4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 
We analyzed the performance of our scheme via simulations. Section 4.1 contains 
detailed explanation of system parameters. Simulation setup is given in Section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 shows the simulation results including performance metrics. 
4.1. System Parameters & Performance Metrics 
System Parameters: 
 Round threshold, roundT , is the maximum number of rounds in which a node a needs 
to witness an anomaly about a node b to keep node b in its local suspected nodes 
list.  
 Alarm threshold, alarmT , is the minimum number of alarm to broadcast a node as 
globally suspected. 
 Revocation threshold, revocT , is the number of nodes required to revoke a node. 
   and )1(   are the weights used for estimating the network features defined in 
the proposed scheme. We simulated different values of   varying between  1..0  
interval. The results show that the more optimal and stable value for   is 0.5. 
Therefore, we choose   as 0.5 in our simulations. 
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Performance Metrics: 
Detection rate and false positive rate are our main metrics while evaluating the 
success of the simulations. Detection rate is the ratio of the number of simulation runs 
where the wormhole is detected successfully, call D#, over total number of simulation 
runs, call S#. It is computed as follows: 
S#
D#
 rateDetection           (5) 
False positive rate per simulation run is computed as the ratio of falsely detected 
nodes, call F#, over total node number, N. False positive rate is the average of this ratio of 
all simulation runs.  It is computed as follows: 
S#
)
N
F#
(
 rate positive False
S#
1

        (6) 
4.2. Simulation Setup 
Simulation code is written using C# language in Windows 32-bit operating system. 
We perform 20 simulations for each parameter value; the results presented in the graphs 
are average of 20 simulations. In our simulations, 200N  nodes are distributed over a 
field of mmA 100100  . We use random way point mobility model in which each node 
chooses a random destination; moves towards it with a uniformly distributed random speed 
in the range of  m/sm/s, 155 ; and stops for a preset duration when it reaches the 
destination. Nodes have a communication range of m15 . Alarm threshold, alarmT , varies 
between  90...10  with 5 units increments. We simulated three values ( NTrevoc  05.0 , 
NTrevoc  10.0 , and NTrevoc  15.0 ) for the percentage of nodes that are required to 
revoke a node.  We assume that some of the nodes in the network, which is selected as %5  
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of all nodes, are static all the time.  Also, we assume that the wormhole attack is not 
performed right after the deployment of the sensor nodes during stabilization phase. The 
proposed scheme is composed of two phases: (i) stabilization, (ii) detection. Stabilization 
phase runs once and lasts 1000S  rounds. Detection phase runs during the lifetime of a 
sensor node due to the possibility of wormhole attack being performed at any time. 
However, we limit this value to 2000 rounds in our simulations. In each round, a node 
discovers its neighbors, shares its own neighbor count with its neighboring nodes, and runs 
the wormhole detection algorithm locally. Secure neighbor discovery is a challenging issue 
in mobile wireless networks. There are proposed solutions, some of which are [23], [24], 
[25], and [26], in the literature to overcome this difficulty considering the mobility of 
nodes as well as energy-efficiency. We assume that each node can discover its neighbors 
securely. 
4.3. Simulation Results 
The organization of this section is as follows: Section 4.3.1 explains the details of 
the performance metrics which are: (i) detection rate, (ii) false positive rate, (iii) detection 
round, and (iv) memory requirements. Section 4.3.1 analyzes the detection rates; Section 
4.3.2 analyzes the false positive rates; Section 4.3.3 discusses the average detection 
duration in terms of round; Section 4.3.4 shows the average memory requirement in the 
simulations in a comparative way; and finally, Section 4.3.5 analyzes the effect of node 
density and size of deployment area on detection and false positive rates. 
25 
 
4.3.1. Detection Rates 
Figure 4.1 shows the detection rate with varying node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm 
threshold ( alarmT ) values. Details of these values are given in Section 4.2 which explains 
the simulation setup. Round threshold ( roundT ) is set to 10. When a node, a, witnesses a 
suspicious behavior of another node, b, a adds b in its list for locally suspicious nodes. If a 
does not detect any anomaly about b for 10 rounds, then a deletes b from its list. Increasing 
revocT  means that more nodes are needed to claim a node as malicious and revoke that node. 
Hence, detection rate increases when revocT  decreases as expected. If alarmT  is increased, a 
node needs to witness more suspicious behaviors of a node to broadcast it as globally 
suspected.  As a result, detection rate decreases with the increase in alarmT . 
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Figure  4.1: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly.  
Figure 4.2 shows the impact of round threshold ( roundT ) on the detection rate under 
varying node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values. Round threshold 
( roundT ) is set to 20 which is the only difference from the results shown in Figure 4.1. When 
a node, a, witnesses a suspicious behavior of another node, b, a adds b in its list for locally 
suspicious nodes. If a does not detect any anomaly about b for roundT  rounds, then a deletes 
b from its list. Exceeding alarmT  becomes more difficult as roundT  increases unless a node 
continuously shows suspicious behaviors which imply it is a potential malicious node. 
Comparing to the results presented in Figure 4.1, the detection rate is more or less higher in 
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Figure 4.2. Also, detection rate decreases more gradually when revocT  is set 20 as compared 
to Figure 4.1. 
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Figure  4.2: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. 
In Figure 4.3, the effects of wormhole location on detection rate are presented 
under varying node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values. Round threshold 
( roundT ) is set to 10. Location of the wormhole is the only difference from the results 
presented in Figure 4.1. Locating wormhole at )25,25(  and )75,75( , we make sure that the 
wormhole is not on the borders of the deployment area, and thus, it affects more nodes in 
the network. The probability to detect wormhole increases due to the fake neighboring 
connections which are introduced by the wormhole link. This increase in fake neighbors 
28 
 
creates more anomalies in terms of the deviation from the pre-computed network density. 
Detection rate is higher as compared to the results presented in Figure 4.1. A detection rate 
of 100% is achieved up to 40alarmT  when revocT  is 10 which is 5% of the nodes in the 
network. However, the decrease in detection rate after 40alarmT  sharper compared to 
Figure 4.1. 
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Figure  4.3: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . 
The impact of round threshold ( roundT ) is presented in Figure 4.4 under varying 
node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values. roundT  is set to 20 which is the 
only difference from the results shown in Figure 4.3. Increase in roundT   smoothes the sharp 
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decrease shown in Figure 4.3. In other words, detection rates decrease more gradually 
alarmT  increases. Moreover, the detection rates at high alarmT  increases as roundT  increases 
from 10 to 20. Its impact is more obvious when revocT  is 10. Also, the detection rate is over 
50% up to 70alarmT . 
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Figure  4.4: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . 
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4.3.2. False Positive Rates 
Figure 4.5 shows the false positive rate with different node threshold ( revocT ) and 
alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values which are explained in detail in Section 4.2. Round 
threshold ( roundT ) is set to 10. False positive rate varies between 0.004 and 0.014 with the 
given values. Increasing alarmT  implies that a node needs to witness more anomalies of a 
node to broadcast it as globally suspected. Hence, we can say that the number of falsely 
detected nodes decreases as alarmT  increases. The simulation results verify that observation. 
Increasing alarmT  decreases the false positive rate up to a point; and false positive rate does 
not change much after a high enough alarmT  value. revocT  is also inversely proportional to 
the false positive rate since high revocT  means more nodes are required to agree on revoking 
a node. Hence, if we increase revocT , the false positive rate decreases. 
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Figure  4.5: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. 
The impact of round threshold ( roundT ) on the false positive rate under different 
node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values is presented in Figure 4.6. The 
only difference from simulations shown in Figure 4.5 is the choice of round threshold 
( roundT ) which is 20 in this case. Increasing roundT  makes it more difficult to exceed alarmT  
unless a node continuously shows suspicious behaviors. Depending on this observation, 
one can say that increase in roundT  decreases the false positive rates. However, the 
simulation results do not verify this implication. This may be because of the low increase 
in roundT , or the effect of detecting wormhole. In order to verify it for sure, higher values for 
roundT  should be analyzed.  
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Figure  4.6: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. 
In Figure 4.7, the impact of location of wormhole on the false positive rates under 
various node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values. The value for round 
threshold ( roundT ) is 10. Only difference from the simulations presented in Figure 4.5 is the 
location of wormhole. We locate the wormhole ends at )25,25(  and )75,75(  which means 
that the wormhole ends are not on the borders of the deployment area. This implies that 
more nodes are affected by the wormhole link. Due to the fake neighboring connections 
introduced by the wormhole link, the probability of detecting wormhole becomes higher. 
In other words, when a node is under the effect of wormhole, it witnesses more suspicious 
behaviors which lead to detection of wormhole sooner. By intuition, one can say that 
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affecting more nodes may result in the increase of the false positive rate. However, the 
impact of detecting wormhole earlier decreases the false positive rate which can be seen 
more obviously when revocT  is lower. The results shown in Figure 4.5, at 35alarmT  and 
when revocT  is 10 and 35alarmT , the value of false positive rate is 0.08% in Figure 4.5 
while it is 0.05% Figure 4.7.  
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Figure  4.7: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
Figure 4.8 shows the effects of round threshold ( roundT ) with different node 
threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values. roundT  is chosen as 20 which is 
different from the results shown in Figure 4.7. There is a slight increase in false positive 
rates depending on the change in roundT . However, as alarmT  increases, especially after 50, 
34 
 
false positive rate becomes lower as compared to the simulation results shown in Figure 
4.7 which may be a result of the increase in detection rates (over 50% up to 70alarmT ) 
presented in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure  4.8: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
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4.3.3. Detection Round 
Figure 4.9 presents the average detection rounds with varying node threshold 
( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ). Details about these values are explained in detail in 
Section 4.2 which gives simulation setup. Round threshold ( roundT ) is chosen as 10. As 
mentioned in Section 4.2, stabilization phase runs 1000 rounds and detection phase starts 
right after stabilization phase ends. Hence, if detection round is shown as 1200, it means 
that the wormhole is detected at 200
th
 round. High alarmT  values indicate that to broadcast a 
node n as globally suspected, node m needs to witness more suspicious behaviors of node 
n. Hence, if we increase alarmT , detection round also increases which is an expected result. 
Increase in revocT  results in increase in detection round due to the requirement of more 
nodes to agree on revoking a node. 
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Figure  4.9: Detection round vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. 
In Figure 4.10, the effect of round threshold ( roundT ) on detection round is presented 
under different node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values. roundT  is set to 20 
which differs from the case shown in Figure 4.9. Exceeding alarmT  becomes more difficult 
when roundT  increases unless a node continuously shows anomalies. By intuition, one can 
say that this decreases the number of false positives. Hence, the network does not loose 
nodes which can be helpful in detection of wormhole. This may affect the detection round. 
However, depending on the simulation results, we cannot say detection round changes 
much. The results are more or less same as compared to the case presented in Figure 4.9. 
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Figure  4.10: Detection round vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. 
The impact of location of wormhole on the detection round is analyzed in the 
simulation presented in Figure 4.11. Location of the wormhole is the only difference from 
the case shown in Figure 4.9. By locating wormhole ends at )25,25(  and )75,75( , we 
guarantee that wormhole ends are not on the borders of the deployment area, and thus, 
wormhole affects more nodes in the network. Wormhole becomes more detectable due to 
the increase in neighbors caused by the wormhole link. Simulation results show that 
detection rounds are lower in the results shown in Figure 4.11 as compared to the case 
presented in Figure 4.9.  
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Figure  4.11: Detection round vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
In Figure 4.12, the results of increasing round threshold ( roundT ) are analyzed under 
different node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values. roundT  is set to 20 
which is the only difference from the case presented in 4.11. There is a slight decrease in 
detection rounds due to the increase in roundT . The effect of this change can be seen for the 
case where revocT  is 10. The sharp increase in detection round in Figure 4.11 is smoothed in 
Figure 4.12. One can observe that increasing roundT  when revocT  is low enables detection of 
wormhole sooner even at high alarmT  values. For instance, when alarmT  is 50 and revocT  is 10, 
wormhole is detected at 2200
th
 round in Figure 4.11 while it is detected less than 1800
th
 
round in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure  4.12: Detection round vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 20revocT , and 
30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
4.3.4. Memory Requirements 
LocalSuspectsList is the list which keeps locally suspected nodes before 
broadcasting them to the network as globally suspected. Each entry in LocalSuspectsList 
contains the identity of the suspected node (2 bytes), an alarm counter (1 byte) for it, and 
last round (2 bytes) in which an anomaly detected about it. So, 5 bytes are required for 
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each entry in the LocalSuspectsList. Hence, the memory requirement for LocalSuspectsList 
is calculated via multiplication of list size by 5 bytes. 
GlobalSuspectsList is for keeping globally suspected nodes, and it is more or less 
same at all nodes. Each entry in GlobalSuspectsList contains the identity of the global 
suspect (2 bytes), and the identities of nodes that broadcasted it as globally suspected. In 
order to cover the worst case, we assume that all suspected nodes in the GlobalSuspectsList 
are broadcasted by revocT  many nodes. Hence, the memory required for each entry in the 
GlobalSuspectsList is calculated via the following formula: 
2)2( revocT           (7) 
Hence, the required memory for GlobalSuspectsList is obtained via multiplication of list 
size by (7). 
Figure 4.13 presents the average size of the list kept for locally suspected nodes 
with different node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) which are detailed in 
Section 4.2. Round threshold ( roundT ) is chosen as 10. Increasing revocT  increases the 
average size of lists kept for locally suspected nodes. The average list size linearly 
increases with the increase in alarmT  which is an expected result. When alarmT  is high, a 
node needs to detect more anomalies to deem a node as globally suspected, and thus, delete 
it from its locally suspected node list as explained in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure  4.13: Average LocalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. 
In Figure 4.14, the impact of round threshold ( roundT ) on detection round is analyzed 
with varying node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values. roundT  is set to 20 
unlike the case in Figure 4.13. Simulation results do not show a major difference except a 
slight increase in when alarmT  is low in Figure 4.14 as compared to the results presented in 
Figure 4.13. The results are more or less same as compared to the case presented in Figure 
4.13. 
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Figure  4.14: Average LocalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. 
Figure 4.15 analyzes the effect of wormhole location on the list size which is for 
locally suspected nodes. Only location of the wormhole is different from the case shown in 
Figure 4.13. Using the same reasoning, when we locate the wormhole ends at )25,25(  
and )75,75( , we make sure that the wormhole ends are not on the borders of the 
deployment area, and as a result, more nodes are affected by the wormhole. Due to the 
increase in neighboring connections which creates more anomalies in the network, 
wormhole becomes more detectable. This case is mentioned in Section 4.3.2 while 
discussing the impact of wormhole location on detection round. Wormhole is detected 
sooner if wormhole is located in such a way. Hence, the list size for keeping locally 
suspected nodes decreases as compared to the results presented in Figure 4.13. 
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Figure  4.15: Average LocalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
The impact of increasing round threshold ( roundT ) is shown in Figure 4.16 under 
different node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) values. roundT  is set to 20. The 
list size increases with the increase of roundT  as compared to the results presented in Figure 
4.15. 
44 
 
Average LocalSuspectsList  size vs. Alarm threshold (Talarm)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Alarm threshold (Talarm)
A
ve
ra
ge
 L
oc
al
Su
sp
ec
ts
Li
st
 s
iz
e 
(b
yt
es
)
Revocation threshold - 5% of nodes
Revocation threshold - 10% of nodes
Revocation threshold - 15% of nodes
 
Figure  4.16: Average LocalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
Figure 4.17 shows the average size of the list kept for globally suspected nodes 
with varying node threshold ( revocT ) and alarm threshold ( alarmT ) which are detailed in 
Section 4.2. Round threshold ( roundT ) is set to 10. Increase in revocT  means that more nodes 
are required to agree on revoking a node, and thus, delete it from its globally suspected 
node list as explained in Figure 4.3. If alarmT  increases, the frequency of broadcasting 
globally suspected nodes decreases since more anomalies need to be detected to deem a 
node as globally suspected. Hence, the list size decreases as expected. 
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Figure  4.17: Average GlobalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. 
Figure 4.18 analyzes the effects of round threshold ( roundT ) on the average list size 
which is kept for globally suspected nodes. roundT  is set to 20 unlike the case in Figure 
4.17. Although, there are not major differences from the results shown in Figure 4.17, the 
list size slightly decreases.  Also, the decrease in the list size with the increase in alarmT  is 
sharper and more observable when revocT  is 10. 
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Figure  4.18: Average GlobalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are chosen randomly. 
Figure 4.19 shows the effect of wormhole location on the list size which is for 
keeping globally suspected nodes. Due to locating wormhole ends at )25,25(  and )75,75( , 
wormhole affects more nodes in the network.  However, by doing so, it increases the fake 
neighboring connections and creates more anomalies which lead to broadcasting more 
globally suspected nodes to the network. The list size increases as compared to the results 
presented in 4.17. 
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Figure  4.19: Average GlobalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
The effect of increasing round threshold ( roundT ) on the average list size is analyzed 
in Figure 4.20. roundT  is chosen as 20. As roundT  increases, the average list size decreases 
slightly compared to the results in Figure 4.19. 
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Figure  4.20: Average GlobalSuspectsList size vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 10revocT , 
20revocT , and 30revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
 
 
4.3.5. Sensitivity against Node Density and Size of Deployment Area 
In this section, detection rate and false positive rate are analyzed based on the 
changes in node density and size of the deployment area. In Figure 4.21, Figure 4.22, 
Figure 4.23 and Figure 4.24, the deployment area is increased to 2m 200200 without 
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changing the node density in the area. To do so, the number of nodes is set to 800. In 
Figure 4.25, Figure 4.26, Figure 4.27 and Figure 4.28, the node density is increased by 
increasing the number of nodes to 400 while the deployment area is the same, 
2m 100100 . Two values of round threshold, 10roundT  and 20roundT , are simulated 
where the locations of the wormhole ends are set to )25,25(  and )75,75( . 
Figure 4.21 shows the detection rate when 10roundT . Since the number of nodes is 
increased, the required number of nodes to agree on revocation of a suspected node ( revocT ) 
also increases. Although the node density is the same, increase in deployment area and 
revocT causes a sharp decrease in the detection rate. This decrease can be observed in a 
clearer way when the results are compared with the case presented in Figure 4.3, where 
deployment area is 2m 100100  and the number of nodes is 200. Detection rate is close to 
100% until 40alarmT  in the results shown in Figure 4.3, while it decreases below 50% in 
Figure 4.21.  
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Figure  4.21: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 40revocT , 80revocT , and 
120revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . 
In Figure 4.22, the only difference is the value of roundT . roundT  is set to 20 in this 
case. Detection rate is not high as compared to Figure 4.21 when alarmT  is low. However, 
the decrease in detection rate presented in Figure 4.21 is sharper as compared to the results 
shown in Figure 4.22 when alarmT  does not exceed 50. 
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Figure  4.22: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 40revocT , 80revocT , and 
120revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . 
Figure 4.23 presents the effect of increase in deployment area and revocT  on false 
positive rate. roundT  is set to 10. Due to increase in revocT , more nodes need to agree on 
revoking a suspected node; thus, the number of falsely revoked nodes decreases as 
compared to the results presented in Figure 4.7 where deployment area is 2m 100100  and 
the number of nodes is 200. Also, since the deployment area is much larger, the probability 
of a node witnessing an anomaly also decreases which can be seen as a reason of the 
decrease in the false positive rate.  
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Figure  4.23: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 40revocT , 80revocT , 
and 120revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
In Figure 4.24, the impact of the increase in roundT  is shown under the new 
simulation setup. roundT  is set to 20, which is the only difference from the case presented in 
Figure 4.23. False positive rate increases with the increase of roundT . This is an expected 
result since increasing roundT  means that a node has more time, compared to the case where 
roundT  is 10, in order to witness a repetitive anomaly. In Figure 4.24, false positive rate 
stabilizes at 0.5%, while it stabilizes at 0.4% in the results presented in Figure 4.23. 
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Figure  4.24: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 40revocT , 80revocT , 
and 120revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
In Figure 4.25, Figure 4.26, Figure 4.27 and Figure 4.28, the deployment area is the 
same, 2m 100100 , but the number of nodes is increased to 400. The goal of these 
simulations is to analyze the effect of node density to our detection scheme.  
Figure 4.25 presents the detection rate under the new case with increased density. 
The number of nodes to revoke a suspected node, which is revocation threshold, increases 
with the increase in the number of nodes. In overall, the detection rate is not high for low 
alarmT  values as compared to the results shown in Figure 4.3. However, for alarmT  values 
above 55, the detection rate does not decrease as much as of the case in Figure 4.3. The 
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results presented in Figure 4.3, detection rate is 15% while in this case it is 20% for high 
alarmT  values. 
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Figure  4.25: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 20revocT , 40revocT , and 
60revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . 
Figure 4.26 shows the impact of the change in roundT  on detection rate. The results 
get better when roundT  is set to 20. Especially for 20revocT , it gets close to the results 
presented in Figure 4.4. Moreover, a detection rate of 20% is achieved for alarmT  values 
above 65, which is decreasing to 10% in the Figure 4.4. 
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Figure  4.26: Detection rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 20revocT , 40revocT , and 
60revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and )75,75( . 
In Figure 4.27, the effect of the increase in node density on false positive rate is 
presented. roundT  is set to 20. The number of falsely revoked nodes decreases with the 
increase of node density as compared to the results shown in Figure 4.3.  Increasing the 
number of nodes also means increasing the revocation threshold, revocT . When revocT  
increases, it becomes hard to revoke a suspected node since more nodes are required to 
broadcast alarm for that suspected node. 
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Figure  4.27: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 20revocT , 40revocT , and 
60revocT . 10roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
Figure 4.28 presents the impact of the change in revocT on false positive rate. revocT  is 
set to 20. For alarmT  values below 50, there is a slight increase in false positive rate as 
compared to the results shown in Figure 4.27. On the other hand, when alarmT  exceeds 55, 
false positive rate decreases to 0.4% while this value is 0.5% for the case 10revocT . 
57 
 
False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold (Talarm)
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
1,5
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Alarm threshold (Talarm)
Fa
ls
e 
p
o
si
ti
ve
 r
at
e 
(%
)
Revocation threshold - 5% of nodes
Revocation threshold - 10% of nodes
Revocation threshold - 15% of nodes
 
Figure  4.28: False positive rate vs. Alarm threshold ( alarmT ) for 20revocT , 40revocT , 
and 60revocT . 20roundT . Wormhole ends are at )25,25(  and  )75,75( . 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Wormhole attack is a physical attack which is a serious threat especially on routing 
protocols. Attracting the network traffic on a low-latency wormhole link empowers an 
attacker to perform various malicious activities such as traffic analysis, denial of service 
attacks, or just selectively drop data packets via controlling this wormhole link. 
In this thesis, we propose a distributed wormhole detection scheme for mobile 
wireless sensor networks which utilizes mobility of sensor nodes to detect wormhole 
attack. Our detection scheme is composed of two phases which are: (i) stabilization phase, 
and (ii) detection phase. In stabilization phase, two network features (i.e. network node 
density, standard deviation in network node density) are estimated through using 
neighboring information in a local manner. In detection phase, wormhole attack is detected 
via observing anomalies in the neighbor nodes’ behaviors based on these estimated 
network features and the neighboring information. We analyzed the performance of 
proposed scheme via simulations using different system parameters. The results show that 
our scheme achieves a detection rate up to 100% with very small false positive rate (at 
most 1.5%) if the system parameters are chosen accordingly. Moreover, our solution 
requires neither additional hardware nor tight clock synchronization which are both costly 
for sensor networks. 
59 
 
6. REFERENCES 
[1] Akyildiz, I. F., Su, W., Sankarasubramaniam, Y., and Cayirci, E. (2002) 
Wireless sensor networks: a survey. Computer Networks, 38(4):393–422. 
[2] Hu, Y.C., Perrig, A., and Johnson, D.B. (2003) Packet Leashes: A Defense 
against Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. IEEE INFOCOM, 
3:1976-1986. 
[3] Hu, L., and Evans, D. (2004) Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole 
Attacks. Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Network and Distributed System 
Security Symposium (NDSS), p.22-32. 
[4] Zhou, Y., Fang, Y., and Zhang, Y. (2008) Securing Wireless Sensor Networks: 
A Survey. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 6-28. 
[5] Capkun, S., Buttyan, L., and Hubaux, J. (2003) SECTOR: Secure Tracking of 
Node Encounters in Multi-hop Wireless Networks. Proceedings of 1st ACM 
workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN), pp. 21-32. 
[6] Buttyan, L., Dora, L., and Vajda, I. (2005) Statistical Wormhole Detection in 
Sensor Networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), 3813:128-141. 
[7] Wang, W., and Bhargava, B. (2004) Visualization of Wormholes in Sensor 
Networks. Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Wireless security (Wise’04), 
pp. 51-60. 
[8] Song, N., Qian, L., and Li, X. (2005) Wormhole Attacks Detection in Wireless 
Ad Hoc Netwroks: A Statistical Analysis Approach. Proceedings of the 19th 
International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS’05). 
60 
 
[9] Qian, L., Song, N., and Li, X. (2007) Detection of wormhole attacks in multi-
path routed wireless ad hoc networks: A statistical analysis approach. Journal 
of Network and Computer Applications, 30(1):308-330. 
[10] Lazos, L., Poovendran, R., Meadows, C., Syverson, P., and Chang, L.W. 
(2005) SeRLoc: Secure Range-Independent Localization for Wireless Sensor 
Networks. Proceedings of ACM workshop on Wireless Security, pp. 21-30. 
[11] Khalil, I., Bagchi, S., and Shroff, N.B. (2005) LITEWORP: A Lightweight 
Countermeasure for the Wormhole Attack in Multihop Wireless Networks. 
International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), pp. 
612-621. 
[12] Ko, Y., Shankarkumar, V., and Vaidya, N. (2000) Medium access control 
protocols using directional antennas in ad hoc networks. Proceedings of the 
19th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications 
(INFOCOM), pp. 13-21. 
[13] Choudhury, R., Yang, X., Ramanathan, R., and Vaidya, N. (2002) Using 
directional antennas for medium access control in ad hoc networks. 8th ACM 
International Conference on Mobile Computing and Neyworking (MobiCOM). 
[14] Khalil, I., Bagchi, S., and Shroff, N.B. (2008) MOBIWORP: Mitigation of 
the Wormhole Attack in Mobile Multihop Wireless Networks. Ad Hoc 
Networks, 6(3):344-362. 
[15] Hu, L., and Evans, D. (2004). Localization for Mobile Sensor Networks. 
ACM MobiCOM’04, pp. 45-57. 
[16] Liu, D., Ning, P., and Du, W. (2005) Detecting Malicious Beacon Nodes for 
Secure Location Discovery in Wireless Sensor Networks. The 25th 
International Conference on Distributed Computer Systems (ICDCS’05), pp. 
609-619. 
61 
 
[17] Du, W., Fang, L., and Ning, P. (2005) LAD: Localization Anomaly 
Detection for Wireless Sensor Networks. Proceedings of the 19th IEEE 
International Parallel & Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS’05). 
[18] Sastry, N., Shankar, U., and Wagner, D. (2003) Secure verification of 
location claims. ACM workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe’03), pp. 1-10. 
[19] Xu, Y., Ouyang, Y., Le, Z., Ford, J., and Makedon, F. (2007) Analysis of 
Range-Free Anchor-Free Localization in a WSN under Wormhole Attack. 
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Modelling, Analysis, and 
Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems, pp. 344-351. 
[20] Kong, F., Li, C., Ding, Q., Cui, G., and Cui, B. (2009) WAPN: a distributed 
wormhole attack detection approach for wireless sensor networks. Journal of 
Zhejiang University – Science, 10(2):279-289. 
[21] Juang, P., Oki, H., Wang, Y., Martonosi, M., S.Peh, L., and Rubenstein, D. 
(2002) Energy-efficient computing for wildlife tracking: design tradeoffs and 
early experiences with ZebraNet. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 36(5):96-107. 
[22] Yick, J., Mukherjee, B., and Ghosal, D. (2008) Wireless sensor network 
survey. Computer Networks, 52(12):2292-2330. 
[23] Ahmad-Kassem, A., and Mitton, N. (2010) Adapting dynamically 
neighborhood table entry lifetime in wireless sensor networks. Wireless 
Communications and Signal Processing (WCSP’10). 
[24] Pham, H., and Jha, S. (2004) Addressing Mobility in Wireless Sensor Media 
Access Protocol. Intelligent Sensors, Sensor Networks and Information 
Processing Conference. 
[25] Kohvakka, M.,,Suhonen, J.,,Kuorilehto, M.,,Kaseva, V.,,Hannikainen, M., 
and Hamalainen, T.D. (2009) Energy-efficient neighbor discovery protocol for 
mobile wireless sensor networks. Ad Hoc Networks, 7 (1), pp. 24-41. 
62 
 
[26] Bagchi, S., Hariharan, S., and Shroff, N. (2007) Secure Neighbor Discovery 
in Wireless Sensor Networks. ECE Technical Reports. Paper 360.  
[27] Curiac, D.-I., Plastoi, M., Banias, O., Volosencu, C., Tudoroiu, R., 
and Doboli, A. (2009) Combined Malicious Node Discovery and Self-
Destruction Technique for Wireless Sensor Networks. Sensor Technologies and 
Applications (SENSORCOMM ’09), pp.436-441. 
[28] Plastoi, M., and  Curiac, D.-I. (2009) Energy-driven methodology for node 
self-destruction in wireless sensor networks. Applied Computational 
Intelligence and Informatics (SACI ’09), pp.319-322. 
